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ABSTRACT
The article concerns the use by police services of
the abstract idea of intelligence-led policing, often
embodied as it is in the United Kingdom in the
National Intelligence Model. We will argue that
while this is a central framing idea in policing, it
contains omissions which lead to faulty decision-
making. The article charts the rise of intelligence-
led policing in the United Kingdom and argues
that circumstances have led to the concept of
intelligence becoming equated to ‘information
which leads to a detection’; however, that this
construction leads to areas of omission which then
impact upon the business of the police service.
One outcome of this is that the members of the
community that the police service is charged with
protecting and serving pay the price of this
decision-making. The central argument of our
article is that an overconcentration on the detec-
tion of offences has skewed the way the map has
been drawn up and how it is currently being
used. Our main contention is not that the concept
of intelligence-led policing should be abandoned,
but that it should be revisited and revised to take
greater notice of the changes in the landscape it is
designed to cover. The territory is changing but
the map is not being amended; it is time for some
major revisions.
INTRODUCTION
Tell me what you dissociate yourself from
and I’ll tell you what you stand for.
(Beck, 2005)
John Cleese and Robin Skynner discussed
the use of abstract ideas in the real world
using the metaphor of a person crossing a
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territory using a map; when he comes to a
river which is not on the map he has to
choose which source of information to rely
on. Cleese states that some people would
rather ‘tear up the territory’ than abandon
the map (Skynner & Cleese, 1993, p. 239).
Our article concerns the use by police
forces of the abstract idea of intelligence-led
policing, often embodied as it is in the
United Kingdom in the National Intelli-
gence Model. We will argue that while this
is a central framing idea in policing, it, like
Cleese and Skynner’s map, contains omis-
sions which lead to faulty decision-making.
The principal difference in this metaphor is
that when the map is wrong it is not always
the police service which falls in the river or
pays the price for the act or omission, but
members of the community that the police
service is charged with protecting and serv-
ing. The central argument of our article is
that an overconcentration on the detection
of offences has skewed the way the map has
been drawn up and how it is currently
being used. Our main contention is not that
the concept of intelligence-led policing
should be abandoned, but that it should be
revisited and revised to take greater notice
of the changes in the landscape it is
designed to cover. In order to understand
why, we need to look at the origins of
intelligence-led policing.
From a United Kingdom perspective, the
concept of intelligence-led policing can be
tracked all the way back to Sir Charles
Rowan of the Metropolitan Police who
brought the art of gathering intelligence
with him from the military (Grieve, 2004,
pp. 26–27, as cited in Kleiven, 2007). It
developed in the 1950s with the formation
of the C9 branch in New Scotland Yard
(Association of Chief Police Officers
[ACPO], 1975), which was formed as a
liaison department to assist officers from
outside the Metropolitan Police when deal-
ing with country house burglaries com-
mitted by offenders who lived in the
London metropolis. The success of this
department led to the growth of intelli-
gence departments, first of all in 1963 in
major cities in England and Wales and then
subsequently throughout the country. In
the mid seventies the Association of Chief
Police Officers (ACPO) defined criminal
intelligence as:
The end product of a process often com-
plex, sometimes physical and always
intellectual derived from information
which has been collated, analysed and
evaluated in order to prevent crime or
secure the apprehension of offenders.
(ACPO, 1975, p.10)
INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING
The 1975 ACPO Report of Sub-
Committee on Criminal Intelligence
(ACPO, 1975) made 79 recommendations,
but a further report in 1986 (ACPO, 1986)
commented on the lack of implementation
of the Baumber recommendations. It found
that (p. 14):
the system was introduced without the
majority of officers having any compre-
hension of what it meant to achieve. To
an extent the system was stillborn.
This report made further recommenda-
tions, and one of the most significant was
that intelligence should not only be ana-
lysed but evaluated as to the reliability of its
origin and content. To support this recom-
mendation a grading system was intro-
duced, where the reliability of the source of
the information was graded A to C for
varying degrees of reliability, with an addi-
tional X where the source was previously
untried. A reflection on the thinking of the
authors was found with the illustrated
examples given: the reliable source was
illustrated with sketches of a police con-
stable, the Queen and a nun. However, the
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untried source was an alien alleging that ET
was responsible for a factory burglary on
Mars! An additional grading of 1 to 4 was
given to evaluate the reliability of the con-
tent. As the authors of the report stated, the
evaluation would indicate the ‘worth and
usefulness of the information’ (ACPO,
1978, p. 85). The recommendations of these
reports represented the state of the intelli-
gence scene in the United Kingdom until
the early 1990s.
The decade of the 1980s leading to the
start of the 1990s saw a dramatic increase in
recorded crime in England and Wales. The
Audit Commission Report, Helping with
Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively (Audit
Commission, 1993) found that crime had
increased in the decade up to 1992 by 74
per cent, whilst the proportion of crimes
detected declined from 37 per cent to 26
per cent. The proposed solutions offered by
the report were increased productivity
through detections per officer, an integrated
approach to policing and an increase in
intelligence-led policing. ‘The core of
police work’, the report stated, ‘is the
linking of evidence from the scene with
information about likely offenders’ (Audit
Commission, p. 35). In addition the report
noted that a small number of offenders
committed a substantial proportion of
detected crime and as such it recommended
that the police ‘target the criminal and not
just the crime’ (Tilley, 2003, p. 313). It also
encouraged covert investigative techniques
such as surveillance and the use of paid
informants and undercover officers (Hobbs,
2001).
The Audit Commission placed intelli-
gence in a specific context, namely as part
of the post-offence investigation process in
terms of providing information leading to
an arrest. It argued that if the police target
and catch serious and prolific offenders,
public confidence and cooperation would
rise and thus with the clear up rate main-
tained or improved, the police would ‘have
time for crime prevention’ (Audit Commis-
sion, 1993, p. 59). It should be noted that
the future debates around intelligence-led
policing are signified here: the primacy of
detection over prevention. This is some-
thing that engages the police service still
today; the belief that targeting prolific
offenders will lead to an increase in public
confidence, and that prevention is to be
undertaken when officers have the time
for it.
Following the report, a handbook was
published, entitled Tackling Crime Effectively,
produced by ACPO, Her Majesty’s Inspect-
orate of Constabulary and the Audit Com-
mission. This handbook, which was a
collaborative effort, emphasised the need
for a performance management framework
which principally addressed arrests and
detections (ACPO, Her Majesty’s Inspect-
orate of Constabulary, & the Audit Com-
mission, 1993, p. 79). In addition, it
cautioned against using the performance
indicators in a negative way which could
damage officer morale or cause cynicism.
This point was illustrated by a cartoon of an
officer sitting before his manager’s desk,
quite clearly shaking with fear, with the
caption ‘Tompkins, I’m worried about your
clear up rate . . .’. (ibid, p.89)
However, the issue of officer account-
ability was about to be further emphasised
from an unlikely source — New York.
NEW YORK
In New York a dramatic drop in recorded
crime occurred between 1994 and 1997.
The then Commissioner of the New York
Police Department, William Bratton was
happy to explain how this was achieved in
an article entitled ‘Crime is Down in New
York City: Blame the Police’ (Bratton,
1998). Bratton described a process based on
accurate information, focused deployment,
effective tactics and relentless follow-up.
Bratton was determined that the primary
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responsibility for everyday operations
resided with his 76 precinct commanders
(Walsh, 2001, p. 352) and they were called
to much feared, weekly Compstat meetings
with the Deputy Commissioner, Jack
Maple. These meetings were designed to
make his commanders accountable for the
crime in New York City, and enabled them
to analyse problems and develop plans and
priorities. Bratton (1998 p. 39) quotes a
description of one such meeting where the
commanders were called in turn to be ques-
tioned by Maple:
‘What’s going on?’ Maple wanted to
know what was being done about the
drug spots, and one of the narcotics
officers said it was a tough area because
business was done inside and there were
lots of lookouts. ‘That’s fine’, Maple said.
‘That’s why we’re detectives. Tell me
what tactics we can employ to penetrate
these locations.’ The detective said they
would try some buy-and-bust operations
and maybe get a couple of guys behind
the Plexiglas to rat when an arrest was
hanging over their heads. Maple wasn’t
satisfied. ‘I want you back here next
week with a plan,’ he said to the Precinct
Captain.
At the same time as the New York policing
model was achieving a high profile, a fur-
ther HMIC report, Policing with Intelligence
(HMIC, 1997) was being published. This
recommended improving the intelligence
structure by setting up regional tasking and
coordination groups, and that ‘all forces
adopt the practice of using formal tasking
criteria for the deployment of specialist
support units, and introduce costing and
evaluation of operations completed’
(HMIC, 1997, p. 35). The foundations of
the National Intelligence Model were
beginning to become clear. However Her
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary was
producing other reports which also talked
about intelligence, but this time the focus
was on the community.
Coexisting with the changes outlined in
the previous paragraphs was a rapidly
changing and diversifying community
which the police would have to serve and
protect. In terms of intelligence-led poli-
cing, the 1990s saw the emergence of the
concept of community intelligence. In
1996, HMIC conducted a thematic inspec-
tion on police community and race rela-
tions entitled, Winning the Race – Policing
Plural Communities (HMIC, 1996). This
inspection raised concerns over police
responses to incidents in the community
and a ‘general lack of understanding and
sympathy . . . by attending officers espe-
cially with regard to non crime matters’
(HMIC, 1996, p. 8). It also found that
forces that regularly assessed community
tensions were best able to respond to com-
munity crisis and concerns, and it recom-
mended that forces collect and analyse
community intelligence which should be
‘valued as highly as criminal intelligence’ in
terms of its contribution to effective poli-
cing (HMIC, 1996, p. 45). A follow-up
inspection, Winning the Race – Revisited
(HMIC, 1999) found that forces were
struggling to define community intelli-
gence, and defined it as:
local information, direct or indirect, that
when assessed provides intelligence on
the quality of life experienced by indi-
viduals and groups, that informs both the
strategic and operational perspectives in
the policing of local communities.
(HMIC, 1999, p. 47)
It concluded by reaffirming the recom-
mendations of the first thematic inspection
and stressed the importance of implement-
ing them urgently (HMIC, 1999, p. 54). As
this report was published, a series of incid-
ents commenced which not only had pro-
found implications for the understanding of
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intelligence-led policing, but also led to the
most tragic of consequences.
HARDING AND HUNTLEY
Throughout the 1990s intelligence-led
policing was driven by the need to increase
detections and to be taking primacy over
the future prevention of crime. Intelligence
was being inextricably linked to what
officers could prove to be true, deal with,
and act upon through detecting offences.
However, the actions taken by Police Con-
stable Mick Harding of Humberside Police
were about to highlight flaws in that mode
of thinking. To return to our opening meta-
phor: he found a river which was not
recorded on the map.
In 1999 PC Harding was working in
Grimsby Police Station as part of a CID
team when information was received link-
ing Ian Kevin Huntley, a local man, to an
allegation of rape. PC Harding, in the
course of obtaining the case papers relevant
to the allegation, became aware that Hunt-
ley was linked to other allegations of rape
and indecency. In all the cases no action was
taken because Huntley had known the vic-
tims and admitted having consensual sex
with them. In addition, the victims were
seen as having a demeanour which made
them less credible as witnesses. As PC Hard-
ing subsequently recalled:
Hang on a second; is he actually phys-
ically targeting people because they are
like that, because he knows that he will
get away with it? If they are not going to
tell the truth to the police for fear of not
being believed, or whatever, then it is
slightly different. (Bichard, 2004, p. 52)
As a result of his work, PC Harding found
evidence which linked Huntley to four
previous allegations of rape and one inde-
cent assault, all of which were discontinued,
and stated that: ‘It is quite clear that Hunt-
ley is a serial sex attacker and is at liberty to
continue his activities’(Bichard, p. 52).
Despite the submission of an intelligence
report recording his findings, and the sub-
sequent acceptance by the then Chief Con-
stable, David Westwood that patterns of
behaviour are particularly important in the
context of sexual offences (Bichard, 2004),
there is no record of any action being taken
by the police with regards to that report. In
fact, it was subsequently ‘weeded’ from the
intelligence system.
On 4 August 2002, in Soham, Cam-
bridgeshire, Huntley was responsible for the
murder of two ten-year-old girls, Holly
Wells and Jessica Chapman. The following
inquiry by Sir Michael Bichard found a
number of failings in the actions of both
Humberside and Cambridgeshire Constab-
ulary. Bichard quotes the Director of Intel-
ligence at Humberside Police who stated in
evidence that ‘there is an alarming ignor-
ance of what constitutes intelligence’
(Bichard, 2004a, para. 3.66). John and
Maguire (1995, as cited in Ratcliffe, 2002,
p. 56) discovered similar shortcomings in
that some forces recorded all they knew
about offenders, whilst others were much
more selective.
The issue we wish to highlight is that in
a culture of intelligence-led policing that
focuses on the primacy of detections, the
intelligence report submitted by PC Hard-
ing was destined to be ignored and margin-
alised, for it did not deal with law enforcement,
it dealt with risk. 
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MODEL
The first guidance for the National Intelli-
gence Model (NIM) was published in 2000
having been developed by the National
Criminal Intelligence Service. It specifically
states that it delivers intelligence and ana-
lysis ‘based on the Crime and Disorder Act
of 1998’ (National Criminal Intelligence
Service [NCIS], 2000, p. 7). The Crime
and Disorder Act 1998, ss. 5 and 6 require
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local agencies to establish partnerships and
through this to form strategies to reduce
crime and disorder (Kleiven, 2005, p. 26).
The NCIS also stated that the NIM would
‘serve the community intelligence require-
ments of “Winning the Race”’ (NCIS,
p. 7). It identified itself as a ‘business plan-
ning’ process which would deliver the out-
comes of community safety, reduced crime,
controlled criminality and controlled dis-
order. Central to its delivery mechanism is
the tasking and coordination process which
enables managers to understand the real
nature of the problems they face, to identify
priorities and resources required, and to
direct the responses needed (NCIS, pp. 9–
13).
In an echo of the New York system it
described a tactical tasking and coordination
meeting which ‘must demand accountabil-
ity from those charged with investigating
targets’ (NCIS, 2000, p. 14). The focus was
centrally controlled and internally focused,
predominantly about law enforcement and
crime control. In terms of a model of
policing it fitted with the military model
of ‘policing against people’ (Bowling &
Foster, as cited by Bowling & Phillips,
2003, p. 549). This means an emphasis on
crime fighting, stop and search, surveil-
lance, intelligence gathering and the pursuit
of ‘enemies within’ (Bowling & Phillips,
p. 549). In spite of its statements, the NIM
did not elaborate how the community
intelligence requirements would be served
or how the outcome of community safety
would be achieved.
In not stating how it would achieve the
community safety outcome, the NIM lays
itself open to two criticisms. The first is that
it states more than it is capable of achieving,
and Gill asks ‘if intelligence-led policing is
to become more than a rhetorical justifica-
tion for traditional policing practices’ (Gill,
2000, p. 261). The second criticism is
whether it can achieve accountability, ie
close the gap between the police and the
community they serve in order better to
achieve community safety. Mike Maguire
talks about the ‘the big if ’ surrounding the
NIM: whether those driving the imple-
mentation will be able to translate inten-
tions into reality (Maguire, 2003, p. 388).
An early indication of the work yet still
to do is found in the Guidance on the NIM
published by the National Centre for Poli-
cing Excellence on behalf of ACPO
(National Centre for Policing Excellence,
2005). It opens by stating that NIM is a
business model for law enforcement, but
whereas the original guide to NIM set out
outcomes to be achieved through a business
process, these outcomes are no longer
included. In place is a process called ‘Opera-
tional Review’ (National Centre for Poli-
cing Excellence, p. 93), where the tactical
tasking and coordination group can com-
mission a review to determine whether key
performance measures have been achieved.
These include reductions in antisocial
behaviour in key categories, improvement
in quality of life or increased sanctioned
detections, and convictions of priority and
prolific offenders. And while it contains
references to community intelligence, it is
still not clear how this impacts on core
policing business. Another incident in 2005
would find that community intelligence
would increase in importance on the police
agenda.
THE LONDON BOMBERS
On 7 July 2005 three explosions occurred
in the London Underground system, fol-
lowed almost an hour later by a fourth
explosion on the upper deck of a London
bus in Tavistock Square. The bombers,
Mohammad Sidique Khan, Hasib Hussain,
Shehzad Tanweer and Jermaine Lindsay,
were killed in what are known to have been
suicide attacks. Also killed in the attacks
were 52 commuters.
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The four bombers were all born and
raised in the United Kingdom, and it subse-
quently emerged that they sympathised
with the cause of Al-Qaida which was
instrumental in the attacks on the World
Trade Centre in New York on 11 Sep-
tember 2001. After the attacks in London, it
emerged that a man who had worked with
two of the suicide bombers had attempted
to inform the police of their activities but
that he had been ignored. Martin Gilbert-
son had worked in a local Islamic bookshop
in Beeston and had assisted in the compila-
tion of DVDs. One of the DVDs contained
images of violence toward America, played
to the soundtrack of ‘The Star-Spangled
Banner’ and concluding with the image of
the first plane crashing into the World Trade
Centre. Two of the bombers, Khan and
Tanweer, were involved in the distribution
of the DVDs. Gilbertson became so con-
cerned about the content of the DVD that
he contacted his local police station in
Holbeck. He was there told to contact West
Yorkshire police headquarters and so he
consequently sent a package of DVDs, a
contact number for himself, and details of a
number of people including Tanweer and
Khan. He was never contacted. When the
details of his account were published, a
police spokesperson stated:
We get all sorts of material on extremist
groups — but it’s impossible to say
whether this made its way into the intel-
ligence system, whether it was dis-
counted as low-level intelligence or
whether it was acted upon in some way.
In an echo of the intelligence relating to Ian
Huntley, information concerning the poten-
tial risks of persons known to the police was
apparently discounted by the police. 
CONCEPTUALISATION
To understand these issues better we will
look at the ways in which intelligence can
be conceptualised. Innes, Fielding and
Cope (2005) conceptualise intelligence in
four levels: criminal, crime, community and
contextual. Criminal relates to the activities
of a known suspect or offender, crime to a
specific crime or series of crime, commun-
ity to information from a community
member or issues within the community,
and contextual relates to wider social, cul-
tural or economic factors which may
impact on crime or levels of offending
(Innes et al., p. 44). An example of con-
textual intelligence would be that the
bombings of 7 July occurred on the anni-
versary of the Bradford Disorders of 2001,
where young men from a predominantly
Asian part of the city were in conflict with
the police and members of the White
community.
One of the most recent examples of how
community intelligence differs from crime
and criminal intelligence was found in the
outbreaks of disorder experienced in Bir-
mingham in October 2005. The Lozells
area of Birmingham contains people from
many cultural backgrounds including
people of African, Caribbean and Asian
heritage. In autumn 2005 a rumour began
to circulate within the communities that a
13-year-old girl had been gang raped by
between 3 and 25 Pakistani men in a local
beauty salon. It was alleged that the girl had
been ‘punished’ for having been caught
shoplifting in the salon, and further that she
had not wanted to report the offences to
the police because she was a Jamaican and
believed that she would be deported. It is
worth pausing and asking: if this were
received as intelligence by the police, how
would it be evaluated?
The current system, is known as 5 × 5
× 5 (and was developed from the 4 × 4
evaluation). It evaluates the reliability of the
source of the information (the first 5), the
known truth of the information (the second
5) and to whom the information can be
circulated (the third 5).
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This evaluation process was designed to
assist police officers to increase detections,
but it would struggle to prove either the
truthfulness of the source or the content of
the information. In spite of this, the local
police acted on the information, not spe-
cifically with a view to increase detections,
but to reduce potential outbreaks of dis-
order between the communities. The
rumour came to the police’s attention on
Monday, and by Saturday the area experi-
enced disorders which resulted in four men
being stabbed, one of whom subsequently
died and two men being shot, one of whom
was a police officer. What appears to matter
here is not the veracity of the rumour but
the impact upon the local community.
DISCUSSION
It could be argued that the emergence of
intelligence-led policing, whilst a modern
concept, sits in a more traditional policing
setting. In a system which is performance
driven and where officers are held account-
able for their actions, the overarching def-
inition for policing is crime detection. In
this context the NIM now describes itself as
a law enforcement model. And it is through
this lens that intelligence is viewed. The
issue of accountability as articulated in the
NIM raises the question; accountable to
whom and for what actions?
As the quote from Beck which opens this
article indicates, it is what gets excluded
when the police service is primarily focused
on law enforcement that interests us here.
In two of the cases cited, the Huntley
intelligence report and the Gilbertson post-
ing to West Yorkshire Police, neither
instance lent itself to simple law enforce-
ment resolutions nor was either acted upon.
To put it crudely, intelligence-led policing
could only make a contribution to address-
ing the risks posed by Ian Huntley after the
tragic deaths of two children — until then
it was busy looking the other way. Likewise,
the interest in Khan and Tanweer was only
evident after the attacks of 7 July and we do
not know, as the police spokesperson stated,
if it was ‘discounted as low-level intelli-
gence’. As the former chief of operations
and analysis in the CIA’s Counter Terrorism
Centre stated, ‘If you’re investigating an act
of terrorism, then you’ve already failed’
(Harris, 2005, p. 106).
However, the intent of this article is not
to be too clever in hindsight. We want to
make the point that if the system is not
sensitive to other forms of intelligence
beyond that which detects crime, it will be
subject to more errors.
The events in Birmingham illustrate how
community intelligence also concerns what
people in communities believe to be true,
but the intelligence evaluation process of
5 × 5 × 5 concerns what the police service
can prove to be true. Peter Manning states
that to the police information from a mem-
ber of the community is suspicious because
it is mediated communication (Manning,
2001, p. 99), and ‘people cannot be trusted
— they are dangerous’ and it is policemen
who ‘can most accurately identify crime
and criminals’ (Manning, 1978, p. 101).
However, Cantle (2001) states that there is a
gap between communities that militates
against understanding, and this can equally
apply to the police service. It is this gap
between the police and the communities
they serve that community intelligence
seeks to close. Now, it can be argued that
the police need to engage with commun-
ities and gain their trust and confidence in
order to obtain the community intelligence
they need to operate effectively. In fact, this
process forms the central part of the United
Kingdom Government’s PREVENT strat-
egy to address counterterrorism.
Still, after over 10 years since the concept
of community intelligence was introduced,
it is legitimate to ask why this still presents a
problem to the police in the United King-
dom. As we have argued in this article, the
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idea which community intelligence seeks to
address is more about managing risk than
increasing detections. Ulrich Beck states,
when discussing the world risk society, that
when experiencing risks which emerge in a
globalised society there are three possible
responses: ‘denial, apathy or transformation’
(Beck, 2006). It could be argued that the
police service is still in denial around these
risks and that it will only be after a number
of significant events are added that it will
begin the process needed to reorganise
itself.
CONCLUSION
Societies are undergoing immense changes
through globalisation, technological devel-
opments and mass migration. The challenge
to the police service is that if it does not
keep up with the changes, it will place both
itself and the communities it serves further
at risk. Our intent with this article has been
to highlight how, by holding on to a con-
cept of intelligence as a process that con-
cerns itself solely with law enforcement, it
has failed to respond to the emergent risks
of a globalised world, not least the threat
from violent extremism. We suggest that for
the police to begin to address these risks
they must first acknowledge the need to
change and recognise that their current
conceptualisation of intelligence is no
longer fit for purpose. The alternative will
be to see further occasions to add to the
ones already outlined where the police were
aware of information but failed to act. As
we currently see it, the territory is changing
but the map is not being amended; it is time
for some significant revisions.
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